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INTRODUCTION

Most American state constitutions contain equal protection
clauses. The words in these clauses often follow the words in the
Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution.
Not
surprisingly perhaps, many state courts read such clauses as
providing no greater equalities than are afforded federally,
following "in lockstep." But some American state constitutions
*

Jeffrey A. Parness is a Professor Emeritus at Northern Illinois University

College of Law. He presented an early draft of this paper at the "State
Constitutional Reform in the New South" symposium in Charleston, South
Carolina on January 16, 2009. He thanks Ed Laube and Frank Lima for their
excellent research assistance.
1. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The
Revival of State Constitutions As Guardiansof Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 535, 550-51 (1986) [hereinafter Brennan, Revival] (criticizing those who
say "proceeding in lockstep with the Supreme Court is the only way to avoid
irrational law enforcement). While they can interpret independent state equal
protection guarantees, state courts often do not do so. See, e.g., Marc L. Miller &
Ronald F. Wright, Leaky Floors:State Law Below Federal ConstitutionalLimits,
50 ARiZ. L. REV. 227, 230 n.9 (2008) ("By most estimates, state courts have not
often exercised their uncontested authority to read their state constitutions
independently and to place greater restrictions on government than the federal
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have special equality provisions having no federal counterparts.
Such clauses not only facilitate, but often require, greater
independent state constitutionalism. For example, in Illinois
there are three special equality provisions beyond the general
equal protection clause.2 They deal with employment, housing,
local government, and school districts.3 Of course, special
provisions can extend, but never diminish, the federal
constitutional, statutory, and regulatory equalities afforded
particular state citizens.4
In Illinois and elsewhere in the United States, constitutional
equalities are promoted by provisions guaranteeing the equal
protection of the laws and insuring freedom from discrimination.
These two types of provisions typically are read as seeking
comparable forms of equality and anticipating similar types of
remedies.5
State human rights commissions and their
equivalents have been broadly delegated powers in many states
regarding both equal protection and nondiscrimination.6
Constitution requires.").
2. ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 17-19.
3. Id.
4. But see Miller & Wright, supra note 1, at 227 (finding "below the floor"
readings by state courts of certain federal constitutional rights of criminal
defendants).
5. For example, in Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931 (2008), the U.S.
Supreme Court recently afforded comparable treatment to differently worded
equality statutes. It ruled that the "plain meaning" of a federal statute
guaranteeing all U.S. citizens "the same right.., as is enjoyed by white citizens
...to inherit... property" involves banning 'discrimination based on race."' Id.
at 1936 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 1982). Thus, as to whether retaliation claims
were included, that statutory right should be construed like another federal
statute that is more explicit about nondiscrimination, but without a mention of
a right, in that it mandates '[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees ... who
are at least 40 years of age . . .shall be made free from any discrimination
based on age."' Id. at 1944 (quoting 29 U.S.C.A. § 633 a(a)).
6. Typically such agencies are established legislatively. See, e.g., S.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-13-40(a) (2005) (providing for creation "in the executive
department the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission, to encourage fair
treatment for, and to eliminate and prevent discrimination against, any
member of a group protected" by the enabling legislation); S.C. CODE ANN. § 113-20 (2005) (declaring "the practice of discrimination against an individual
because of race, religion, color, sex, age, national origin, or disability is . . .a
matter of state concern and. .. unlawful and in conflict with the ideals of South
Carolina and the nation"). But they can be created constitutionally. See, e.g.,
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Nevertheless, there are sometimes reasons to treat differently
equality and nondiscrimination provisions. Equality duties are
often limited to governmental acts, as in the federal Constitution,
while nondiscrimination responsibilities are extended at times to
private acts. As well, even where laws treat people and entities
equally, discrimination may continue or arise.
Antidiscrimination provisions can be read to impose upon
government some affirmative duties to end discrimination even if
not caused by government.
This paper explores the extent to which American states in
the New South should promote greater constitutional equalities
and nondiscrimination than are afforded federally. It begins by
examining the benefits of explicit equality and nondiscrimination
guarantees. It then examines American state experiences inside
and outside the New South. Finally, it explores the employment
arena where new guarantees seem necessary, finding at least one
Illinois provision particularly inviting.
II.

THE BENEFITS OF EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL
EQUALITIES

American state constitutions can play a key role today in
protecting individuals.7
State constitutional laws can afford
protections beyond those dictated by federal lawmakers.
Further, while the federal Constitution contains individual rights
implied through the recognition of federal and state governments
with express, but limited powers, state constitutions can "contain
positive or affirmative rights."8 At worst, such expansive state
constitutional rights can be hortatory, reiterating important
MICH. CONST. art. V, § 29 (creating a civil rights commission "to investigate
alleged discrimination against any person because of religion, race, color or
national origin in the enjoyment of the civil rights guaranteed by law ... and to
secure the equal protection of such civil rights without such discrimination").
7. See Brennan, Revival, supra note 1, at 552 (stating that federalism
protects individual rights at both the state and federal level).
8. Robert F. Williams, The Brennan Lecture: Interpreting State
Constitutions As Unique Legal Documents, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 189, 192
(2002). In other words, since the federal government is limited to acting only
where it is specifically authorized by the Constitution to do so, "federal
constitutional rights are primarily negative in nature." Id.
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values. At best, they can extend important principles locally, if
not nationally, while making majoritarian oppressions of
minorities more difficult and reflecting the distinct political wills
of local citizenry on equality.9
Because of their smaller scale, in constitutional matters
states are more able "to experiment, to improvise, [and] to test
new theories."1o Thus, if a state experiment succeeds, others may
follow and if it fails, only one of fifty states is affected.1 As well,
because they are easier to amend than the federal Constitution,12
state constitutions can more quickly respond to failed
experiments, social changes, and societal needs.13
State constitutional provisions on individual rights can be
read to be independent of, and thus to reach beyond, federal
constitutional provisions14 even where the federal and state
provisions contain similar language.15 For example, while a

9. See, e.g., Christopher W. Hammons, State ConstitutionalReform: Is It
Necessary?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1327, 1342 (2001) ("The inclusion of particular ...
policy type provisions in the constitution indicates that these policy areas are
important to the citizens of the state. In this sense, the constitution of the state
can be tailored to reflect the political culture or values of the people who live
under it ....
To this end, a very detailed constitution may actually have
greater utility than the more generic model that many constitutional reformers
propose.").
10. Stanley Mosk, The Power of State Constitutions in Protecting
Individual Rights, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 651, 652 (1988) (citing New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
11. See Brennan, Revival, supra note 1, at 550 (stating that states are
political and social laboratories). This has been recognized by others on the
United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't. of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
12. Williams, supra note 8, at 228.
13. See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Judicial Federalism:Current Trends and
Long-Term Prospects, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1053, 1084-85 (1992) ("Rights of
privacy, environmental protection provisions, equal rights guarantees, and
other innovative reforms have been found in recent additions to state
constitutions.").
14. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) [hereinafter Brennan,
Protection] (State constitutions serve as "a font of individual liberties, their
protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's
interpretation of federal law.").
15. Id. at 495 (Independent interpretations are possible even when state
constitutional rights are "identically phrased."). For an example of the factors
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successful federal constitutional equal protection claim based on
race discrimination requires proof of discriminatory intent or
purpose,1 6 a state constitutional equal protection claim need not
require similar proof. State constitutions can also expressly
recognize broader equalities. They can speak to private as well
as public conduct.
They can make judicial review of
discriminatory acts more probing.17
III. EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITIES IN THE
NEW SOUTH
The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution
demands that "[n]o state shall . . .deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."18 This equality
principle has been extended judicially to the federal government.
Its words thus bind all American governments. Its words on
state and local governmental duties are repeated in varying state
constitutions in the New South. Thus, in South Carolina,19
Louisiana,20 North Carolina,21 and Georgia,22 no person is to be
"denied the equal protection of the laws." By contrast, in Texas,
a self-operative provision declares that "[e]quality under the law
shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed,
or national origin."23 Some New South constitutions recognize
used by courts in determining whether to extend broader rights under a state
constitution than are required by the federal Constitution, see Washington v.
Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 812-13 (Wash. 1986) (listing "six nonexclusive neutral
criteria").
16. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265-66 (1977).
17. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 401 (Cal. 2008)
(maintaining classifications based on sexual orientation are constitutionally
suspect and subject to strict scrutiny).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
19. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3.
20. LA.CONST. art. I, § 3.
21. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
22. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. II.
23. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a. This provision has been read to go beyond
"both the United States and Texas due process and equal protection
guarantees." In re McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1987) (The provision
"elevates sex to a suspect classification.").
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equality in different ways.
For example, the Arkansas
constitution declares, "[a]ll men are created equally free and
independent," with "certain inherent and inalienable rights"24
secured as a result of instituting "governments ... among men."25
More particular equality norms exist in some states in the
New South having very general equal protection guarantees.
Thus in Louisiana, the constitution also says that "[n]o law shall
discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas,
beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or
unreasonably discriminate against a person because of birth, age,
sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations."26
And in North Carolina, "discrimination by the State" is also
constitutionally prohibited if based on "race, color, religion, or
national origin."27
IV. EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITIES
ELSEWHERE
Outside the New South, some American states have even
stronger express constitutional equality norms. In Illinois, three
constitutions preceded the current 1970 constitution.28 The 1818
Illinois constitution, drafted and debated within three weeks,29
contained no provision on equality.30 A constitutional convention
24. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also Ky. CONST. § 1 of Bill of Rights; FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 2 (protecting "[a]ll natural persons, female and male alike").
25. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 2.
26. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3. This provision has been read to go beyond the
decisional law construing federal constitutional equal protection. State v.
Granger, 982 So. 2d 779, 788 (La. 2008).
27. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (After declaring
"all" natural persons "are equal before the law," the provision goes on: "No
person shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion, national origin,
or physical disability.").
28. These constitutions were ratified in 1818, 1840, and 1870.
29. JANET CORNELIUS, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN ILLINOIS 1818-1970, at 10

(1972).
30. While it had no general or special equal protection/nondiscrimination
provision, the 1818 constitution did declare that "all men are born equally free
and independent." ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, §1. It also said that "elections
shall be free and equal." ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, §5. It clearly did not
contemplate equality for women (or nonwhites, perhaps) as the right to vote
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was held in 1846 out of concern that the 1818 constitution had
become ineffective due to increased population, changing
demographics, and financial difficulties arising from an overly
zealous legislature.31 The resulting 1848 constitution contained a
"substantially unchanged" bill of rights.32 Another convention in
186933 resulted in a new constitution in 1870.34 While more
detailed, the 1870 constitution contained a bill of rights like its
predecessors.35 The 1870 constitution remained in place for a
century. 36 The journey to its replacement began in the 1940s3 7
and ended with a call in 1968 for a constitutional convention.38
Interestingly, a new bill of rights was not part of the initial
agenda,39 though a bill of rights committee was formed.40 This
committee began its work by studying similar bills in other
states, the model state constitution, and scholarly articles.41
Four new equality provisions emerged.42 In approving the 1970
constitution, the people adopted equality provisions within the
bill of rights quite different from not only earlier Illinois
provisions,43 but also from constitutional provisions in most other
American states. 44 The 1970 Illinois Bill of Rights contains both
was recognized for "[a]ll white male inhabitants." ILL. CONST. of 1818, Schedule,
§ 12.
31. CORNELIUS, supra note 29, at 25-27 (There was also interest, "in
accordance with the national trend toward popular control of government," in
changing some state offices from appointive to elective.).
32. Id. at 40.
33. Id. at 59.
34. Id. at 65.

35. Id.

36. ELMER GERTZ & JOSEPH P. PISCIOTTE, CHARTER FOR A NEW AGE: AN

INSIDE VIEW OF THE SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 12 (1970).

37. Id. at 6 (forming the Committee on Constitutional Revision of the
Chicago Bar Association, with Chicago lawyer Sam Witwer as Chair).
38. CORNELIUS, supra note 29, at 58-59.
39. ELMER GERTZ, FOR THE FIRST HOURS OF TOMORROW: THE NEW ILLINOIS

BILL OF RIGHTS 7 (1972) [hereinafter GERTZ, TOMORROW].
40. GERTZ & PISCIOTTE, supra note 36, at 66.
41. GERTZ, TOMORROW, supra note 39, at 7-15.
42. ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 17-19.

43. Ann Lousin, The 1970 Illinois Constitution: Has It Made a Difference?,
8 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 571, 599 (1988) ("The 1870 Constitution had guaranteed due
process of law, but not equal protection of the laws.").
44. Elmer Gertz, The Unrealized Expectations of Article I, Section 17, 11 J.
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explicit equal protection45 and antidiscrimination46 provisions.
Given earlier difficulties in undertaking constitutional reforms in
Illinois through the general assembly,47 as well as the historical
lack of independent state constitutional interpretation by the
Illinois courts, 48 the 1970 initiatives were quite significant.49
They replaced stagnant Illinois constitutional doctrine50 that
failed to fulfill the distinctive role of state constitutionalism in
the federal system.5 1
In 1970, Section 2 of Article I was added. It contains the
general proposition that no person shall be "denied the equal
protection of the laws."52 Section 17 embodies more particular
assurances, and the strongest of the guarantees of equality, as it
says:
Section 17. No discrimination in Employment and the
Sale or Rental of Property
All persons shall have the right to be free from
discrimination on the basis of race, color, creed, national
ancestry and sex in the hiring and promotion practices of any

MARSHALL J. of PRAC. & PROC. 283, 283 (1978) [hereinafter Gertz, Expectations]

(The new bill of rights contained the "strongest nondiscrimination provisions of
any state constitution.").
45. ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 18.
46. ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 17, 19.
47. See CORNELIUS, supra note 29, at chs. I-VI; Samuel W. Witwer,
Introduction, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 567, 567 (1988) (concluding that "the 1870
Constitution had become virtually unamendable").
The 1970 constitution
included for the first time an "automatic 20-year question," whereby a possible
constitutional convention was placed on the general election ballot every 20
years in the absence of general assembly action. Id. Previously, the general
assembly had sole discretion to convene a constitutional convention. Id.
48. Brannon P. Denning, Survey of Illinois Law: Constitutional Law, 25 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 733, 758 (2001); 14 ILL. LAW & PRAC. COURTS § 94. The so-called
lockstop doctrine exists where a state high court generally applies United
States Supreme Court analysis of the federal constitution when analyzing
similar state constitutional provisions.
49. Gertz, Expectations, supra note 44, at 283.
50. GERTZ & PISCIOTTE, supra note 36, at 3-6 (viewing the Illinois
constitution as antiquated).
51. See, e.g., Brennan, Protection,supra note 14, at 503 (commenting state
courts have a "manifest purpose ... to expand constitutional protections").
52. ILL. CONST. art. I, §2.
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employer or in the sale or rental of property. These rights are
enforceable without action by the General Assembly, but the
General Assembly by law may establish reasonable exemptions
relating to these rights and provide additional remedies for
their violation.53

Sections 18 and 19 are also more particular about equality
than Section 2, though seemingly less protective than Section 17
since they do not contain self-executing clauses. These two
sections say:
Section 18. No Discrimination on the Basis of Sex
The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or
abridged on account of sex by the State or its units of local
government and school districts.
Section 19. No Discrimination Against the Handicapped
All persons with a physical or mental handicap shall be
free from discrimination in the sale or rental of property and
shall be free from discrimination unrelated to ability in the
5
hiring and promotion practices of any employer. 4
The general assembly enacted the Illinois Human Rights Act
to implement the new equality provisions.55 Unfortunately, it
falls short in protecting all persons by unduly restricting those
who can seek remedies.56 As well, the Illinois Supreme Court has
so far paid too much deference to the general assembly and has
deserted many who suffer the very inequalities specifically
addressed in the new constitutional provisions.57 Nevertheless,
the Illinois provisions demonstrate the potential scope of explicit
53. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
54. ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 18, 19.
55. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-101 to 5/10-104 (2006).

56. For example, within the definitions sections, the general assembly has

limited the persons covered by the protections of the Act. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT.

5/2-101, 102. For a critique of the Act, see Jeffrey A. Parness and Laura J. Lee,
Inequalities
in
Illinois
Constitutional
Equality,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1354060.
57. Lousin, supra note 43, at 602 ("In effect, then, there is no longer a
constitutional remedy against employment discrimination in Illinois.").

469
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state constitutional equality norms.
The Illinois pattern is followed elsewhere in the United
States with general equal protection statements as well as
specific equality mandates. At times, general equality norms are
expressed in different words. Further, some special equality
norms go beyond employment, property transactions, and
governmental acts, including schooling; they also go beyond
inequalities based on race, color, creed, national ancestry, sex
and handicap. Moreover, inequalities are sometimes encouraged,
though subject to federal constitutional limits.
General equality under laws is promoted in some states
without
express
reference
to
equal
protection
or
nondiscrimination.58 For example, in California a "person may
not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business,
profession, vocation, or employment because of sex, race, creed,
color, or national or ethnic origin."59 There as well, "[n]oncitizens
have the same property rights as citizens."60 In Iowa, "[a]ll laws
of a general nature shall have a uniform operation."61 In Kansas,
"[n]o distinction shall ever be made" between citizens and
noncitizens "in reference to" certain property matters. 62 And in
New Mexico there is "perfect equality" for children of Spanish
descent with other children in public schools.63
Special equality norms occasionally go beyond employment,
property sale or rental, and government. For example, some
states explicitly direct equalities and nondiscrimination in
certain railroad matters. Thus, in Kentucky, railroads and other
common carriers must be "regulated, by general law, as to

58. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20 ("[C]ivil or political rights" should be
based on "[e]qual protection" as well as no "segregation or discrimination.");
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11 (allowing no denial of "equal protection" and no
"discrimination" in civil rights matters).
59. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8.
60. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 20; see also ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 13 (The "same
terms" shall apply "equally" to "all citizens or corporations".); N.D. CONST. art. I,
§ 21 (granting privileges and immunities to all citizens "upon the same terms").
61. IOWA CONST. art. I, § 6; see also UTAH CONST. art. I, § 24.
62. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 17.
63. N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 10.
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prevent unjust discrimination"64 in freight and passenger
transportation. As well, railroads must operate all cars and
freight "with equal promptness and dispatch, and without any
discrimination as to charges."65 In Hawaii, citizens cannot "be
denied enlistment" or "segregated" while in a state "military
organization" because of "race, religious principles or ancestry."66
In Missouri "[n]o citizen shall be disqualified from jury service"
or from holding state office because of sex.6 7 In Connecticut,
there are equalities "in the exercise or enjoyment of ...

civil or

political rights."68
Special
equality
norms
also
extend
inappropriate
classifications beyond the Illinois provisions on race, color, creed,
national ancestry, sex, and handicap. For example, aliens who
are bona fide residents have the same property rights as native
born citizens in Colorado.69
Equality mandates operate in
Connecticut for any person with "physical or mental disability,"70
and perhaps operate differently from the Illinois standards on
"physical or mental handicap."71 Nondiscrimination protections
extend in New Jersey to "religious principles."72 Mandates are
found in Montana for "political .

.

. ideas," "culture," and "social

origin or condition."73 In the District of Columbia, there are
equality assurances for "sexual orientation, poverty or
parentage."74 And in South Dakota, "privileges or immunities"

64. Ky. CONST. § 196; see also COLO. CONST. art. XV, § 6.
65. KY. CONST. § 213; see also ARK. CONST. art. XVII, § 3.
66. HAw. CONST. art. I, § 3.
67. MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(b); MO. CONST. art. VII, § 10; see also W. VA.
CONST., art. III, §21 (providing no sex discrimination in jury service).
68. CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20.
69. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 27; see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 20 (noncitizens
and citizens); MICH. CONST. art. X, § 6 (aliens and citizens); S.D. CONST. art. VI,
§ 14 (observing no property distinctions "between resident aliens and citizens").
But see NEB. CONST. art. I, § 25 (allowing no discrimination between U.S.
citizens in property matters, but the rights of "aliens ... may be regulated by
law").
70. CONN. CONST. art. XXI.
71. ILL. CONST. art I, § 19.

72. N.J. CONST. art. I, § 5; see also MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4 (extending
protection to "religious ideas").
73. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.

74. D.C. CODE art. I. Bill of Rights, § 3 (2001).
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must belong "equally" to "all citizens or corporations."75
While equality and nondiscrimination mandates commonly
appear, constitutional inequalities are occasionally promoted.
Thus, Alaska is not prohibited "from granting preferences, on the
basis of Alaska residence,"76 though property taxes cannot be
In
different for in-state and out-of-state U.S. residents. 77
Montana, "servicemen, servicewomen, and veterans may be given
In
special considerations determined by the legislature."78
Virginia, while "governmental discrimination" upon the basis of
sex is banned, "the mere separation of the sexes shall not be
considered discrimination."79 Finally, a number of American
states have recently denied equalities to same sex couples by
constitutionally banning marriages for them.80
V.

GREATER EMPLOYMENT EQUALITIES

Additional American state constitutional equalities in
employment in the New South (and elsewhere) are best promoted
by following the Article I, Section 17 approach in Illinois. "All
persons" are accorded nondiscrimination rights, not just those
dealing with government. 8 1 Equalities in employment matters
(and perhaps in the sale or rental of property) are broadly
supported, embodying core contemporary values evoking little
dispute.
And, equality rights in employment should be
enforceable "without action by the General Assembly," though
legislative voice regarding "reasonable exemptions" and possible
"additional remedies" is appropriate.82
The self-executing nature of a constitutional right ensures

75. S.D.

art. VI, § 18.
§ 23.
77. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 9.2.
78. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 35.
79. VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
80. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 ("Only marriage between a man and a
woman is valid or recognized in California."); OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a ("[O]nly a
marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or legally recognized
as a marriage.").
81. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
82. Id.
CONST.

76. ALASKA CONST. art. I,
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that the right is not simply "hortatory."83 It also protects against
legislative usurpation4 through, for example, the total diversion
of the right from trial courts to administrative agencies (or
similar alternative adjudicatory bodies) having no jurors,
diminished coercive authorities (like subpoena powers), and less
procedural safeguards for aggrieved claimants (such as formal
discovery).
Reasonable legislative "exemptions" can include, as in
Illinois, certain religious institutions. Unfortunately,85 in Illinois
the legislators have also exempted all small employers from
many of the constitutional equality norms, notwithstanding the
express constitutional directives that "all" persons have rights
and that any limits via "exemptions" not undercut the broad
protections.86
Constitutional recognition of possible "additional" general
assembly remedies would serve to preserve traditional remedies
against those engaged in discriminatory conduct while
permitting remedial expansions in such areas as attorney's fee
recoveries,
vicarious
liability,
and
responsibilities
for

83. AIDA v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 772 N.E.2d 953, 960-61 (Ill. App. Ct.
2002) (The court held that the Illinois constitution's individual dignity clause,
ILL. CONST., art. I, § 20, that condemns communications inciting "violence,
hatred, abuse or hostility toward, a person or group . . . by reason of . . .
religious, racial, ethnic, national or regional affiliation," was only "hortatory,"
creating no private right; was like "a constitutional sermon," not "an operative
part of the Constitution;" was included "to serve a teaching purpose, to state an
ideal or principle to guide;" and, was "merely an expression of philosophy and
not a mandate that a certain remedy be provided in any specific form.").
84. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3 (The "legislature shall implement"
enjoyment of civil or political rights without regard to race, color, and the like.);
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied...
by the State on account of sex." The "legislature shall have the power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation ....
"); WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, §§ 1-2
(maintaining equality of rights for both sexes, enforced by "appropriate
legislation").
85. The Illinois General Assembly effectively has read the limits regarding
only "reasonable exemptions" as permitting quite broad discretion, not unlike
settings where there is no self-executing right to sue and there is a requirement
that there be implementing statutes. See also HAW. CONST. art. I, § 3 (requiring
equality rights enforcement only by "appropriate legislation"); WASH. CONST.
art. XXXI, § 2.
86. See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
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unintentional acts. Unfortunately in Illinois, legislators have
read their powers regarding "additional" remedies to encompass
powers regarding any, all, or no remedies.87
VI. CONCLUSION
Equality in employment opportunity has broad public
support.
Express state constitutional recognition of a selfexecuting right of all persons to be free from employment
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and other inappropriate
classifications, subject to limited legislative oversight, would
extend equality principles beyond federal mandates in conformity
with fundamental local values; allow for experimentation in
regulating constitutionally nongovernmental as well as
governmental acts; and strike an appropriate balance between
judicial and legislative authority. States in the New South
should consider such new constitutional law initiatives on
employment equalities.

87. But see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(g) (providing remedies for certain
constitutional violations are the same as available under then-existing
California antidiscrimination law); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(6) ("[R]emedies"
available for certain constitutional violations "shall be the same . . . as are
otherwise available for violations of Michigan anti-discrimination law.").

